Fazzio v. Mason Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 36068 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
6-17-2010
Fazzio v. Mason Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
36068
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Fazzio v. Mason Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 36068" (2010). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2534.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2534
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FRANK J. FAZZIO, JR. and CINDY ANN 
FAZZIO, husband and wife, and IDAHO 
LIVESTOCK COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho 
Limited Liability Company, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 














Supreme Court Case No. 36068 
r----···· '.-.. 0 0 '-1 
I FILED· COpy i 
; I 
. I 
" .. I 7 "n'D I v\.. ~ t.._ i I 
( 
------------------------------) 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District for Ada County 
Honorable Kathryn A. Sticklen and Richard D. Greenwood, District Judges, Presiding 
Derek A. Pica, ISB No. 3559 
DEREK A. PICA, PLLC 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: 208.336.4144 
Facsimile: 208.336.4980 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Respondents 
Merlyn W. Clark, ISB No. 1026 
D. John Ashby, ISB No. 7228 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Telephone: 208.344.6000 
Facsimile: 208.954.5210 
Attorneys for Defendant! Appellant 
MAY I 9 2010 I 
lSupnii . , 
E1tei8dciiilrs II[ _ -I 
43464.0001.1874772.1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 
II. ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................................... 1 
A. The District Court Erred In Ordering Specific Perfonnance ........................... 1 
1. Specific Perfonnance Is Not Appropriate Because It 
Would Not Be Practicable or Feasible For Mr. Mason To 
Comply With The Order Of Specific Perfonnance ............................. 1 
2. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Applying 
The Wrong Legal Standard .................................................................. 2 
3. Respondents Do Not Have A Contractual Right To 
Specific Perfonnance ........................................................................... 5 
4. The Appropriate Remedy Is An Award Of Damages .......................... 7 
III. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 9 
- 1 -
43464.0001.1874772.1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Cases 
Anderson v. Whipple, 
71 Idaho 112,227 P.2d 351 (1951) ........................................................................................ 1,4 
Black v. American Vending Co., Inc., 
239 Ga. 632, 238 S.E.2d 420 (Ga. 1977) .................................................................................... 5 
Brooks v. Commissioner of Correction, 
105 Conn. App. 149 (Conn. App. 2007) ..................................................................................... 6 
Childs v. Reed, 
34 Idaho 450, 202 P. 685 (1921) ................................................................................................ 2 
David Steed and Associates, Inc. v. Young, 
115 Idaho 247,766 P.2d 717 (1988) .......................................................................................... 1 
DiGiuseppe v. Lawler, 
269 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. 2008) ....................................................................................................... 6 
Houghton v. Mammoth Ariz. G.M Co., 
68 P.2d 957,50 Ariz. 44 (1937) ................................................................................................. 6 
Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 
146 Idaho 423, 196 P.3d 341 (2008) .......................................................................................... 2 
Lawrence v. Franklin, 
113 Idaho 895, 749 P.2d 1020 (Ct. App. 1988) .......................................................................... 7 
Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 
123 Idaho 253,846 P.2d 904 (1993) .......................................................................................... 7 
Paloukos v. Intermountain Chevrolet Co., 
99 Idaho 740, 588 P.2d 939 (1978) ............................................................................................ 1 
Smith v. King, 
100 Idaho 331, 597 P.2d 217 (1979) .......................................................................................... 7 
- 11 -
43464.0001.1874772.1 
us. v. Stein, 
452 F. Supp.2d 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ......................................................................................... 6 
Zannis v. Lake Shore Radiologists, Ltd. 
392 N.E.2d 126 (Ill. App. 1979) ................................................................................................. 6 
Other Authorities 





Despite Respondents' assertions to the contrary, it is clear that the District Court abused 
its discretion in entering an order of specific performance that requires Appellant, Edward J. 
Mason, to close on the purchase of the Subject Properties. In ordering specific performance, the 
District Court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard. The District Court 
erroneously applied the substantive impossibility of performance standard, which is different 
from the equitable rule against a specific performance order that is not practicable or feasible. 
The District Court's order also violates the rule against specific performance where the plaintiff 
has an adequate remedy at law. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred In Ordering Specific Performance 
1. Specific Performance Is Not Appropriate Because It Would Not Be 
Practicable or Feasible For Mr. Mason To Comply With The Order Of 
Specific Performance 
Idaho law is very clear that a court should not order an equitable remedy, including 
specific performance, which is not feasible. See, e.g., Anderson v. Whipple, 71 Idaho 112, 125, 
227 P.2d 351, 359 (1951), overruled on other grounds by David Steed and Associates, Inc. v. 
Young, 115 Idaho 247, 766 P.2d 717 (1988) ("Equity will not enter a decree for specific 
performance the enforcement of which is not practicable or feasible."); Paloukos v. 
Intermountain Chevrolet Co., 99 Idaho 740, 745-46, 588 P.2d 939,944-45 (1978) (dismissing 
claim for specific performance because "[i]t is well established that the courts will not order the 
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impossible"); Childs v. Reed, 34 Idaho 450, 202 P. 685, 686 (1921) ("Where the contract is of 
such a nature that obedience to the decree cannot be obtained by the ordinary processes of the 
court, equity will decline to interfere."). 
In opposing Respondents' motion for summary judgment, Mr. Mason relied on this 
equitable rule. Mr. Mason submitted affidavits with financial information and a detailed 
explanation of his attempts to find any way possible to close on the purchase of the Subject 
Properties. Mr. Mason's inability to close on the Subject Properties is clear and uncontested. 
Under the well-settled equitable rule, an order of specific performance is not appropriate. 
2. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Applying The Wrong Legal 
Standard 
Respondents correctly point out the applicable standard for determining whether the 
District Court abused its discretion in ordering specific performance: 
A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the issue as 
one of discretion, (2) acts within the boundaries of its discretion and 
applies the applicable legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through 
an exercise of reason. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 2 (quoting Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 429, 196 P.3d 341, 
347) (2008) (emphasis added). 
The District Court abused its discretion in that it did not apply the "applicable legal 
standard." Instead, the District Court applied and rejected the wrong legal test. Mr. Mason 
conceded that he was in breach of the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties. Mr. 
Mason did not assert any substantive defenses to the breach of contract action. Rather, he 
objected only to the specific performance remedy sought by Respondents. He relied exclusively 
on the equitable rule against a specific performance order that is not practicable or feasible, 
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citing the multiple Idaho Supreme Court decisions explaining the applicable equitable rule. Even 
though the issue was not raised by the parties, the District Court asked for supplemental briefing 
on the substantive "impossibility of performance" defense. Mr. Mason explained that the 
"impossibility of performance" defense is a complete and substantive defense that excuses 
performance, as opposed to the equitable rule that precludes specific performance as a remedy, 
but allows for a damages remedy. See R., Exh. 4. Mr. Mason explained that the "impossibility 
of performance" defense does not apply "because the authorities generally hold that financial 
inability to perform does not excuse a breach." Id. at p. 3. Mr. Mason expressly stated that he 
was not relying on the substantive "impossibility of performance" defense. Id. 
Despite Mr. Mason's citation to the applicable legal authorities and his disclaimer of any 
reliance on the substantive "impossibility of performance" defense, the District Court proceeded 
to grant summary judgment in favor of Respondents by analyzing the substantive "impossibility 
of performance" defense. For example, the District Court explained that the "impossibility of 
performance" defense applies only to objective, as opposed to subjective, impossibility. See R., 
pp. 82-83 (explaining that "it is the task itself which must be impossible - it is not enough that 
the particular promissor is unable to perform the task if it would be possible for a different 
promissor to perform" and explaining that the defense does not apply to a "subjective 
impossibility" of performing). The authorities cited by the District Court consisted of cases 
applying the substantive defense, not the equitable rule. The District Court did not address the 
equitable rule against an order of specific performance that is not practicable or feasible. 
Notably, in their appellate briefing, Respondents make the same mistake the District 
Court made in confusing the two separate rules as one in the same. See, e.g., Respondent's 
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Brief, pp. 5-6 (arguing that the District Court properly "rejected Mason's 'equitable 
impossibility' argument based upon the fact that Mason's inability to close was subjective to 
him"; arguing that "Mason presented no evidence that no person could have closed on the 
purchase of Fazio's real property, only that Mason himself was unable to do so .... "). These 
assertions confuse the substantive defense with the equitable rule. This Court has never drawn a 
distinction between objective and subjective impossibility with regard to the equitable rule. In 
fact, there is no requirement that a specific performance remedy be "impossible" to be excluded 
as an appropriate remedy. Rather, the rule broadly prohibits a specific performance remedy that 
"is not practicable or feasible." See, e.g., Anderson, 71 Idaho at 125 (emphasis added). 
The Restatement (First) of Contracts makes clear that the substantive impossibility of 
performance defense is different from the equitable rule and that the question of "subjective" or 
"objective" impossibility is inapplicable to the equitable rule. For example, the Restatement 
explains that the substantive impossibility of performance defense has the effect of "preventing a 
duty to perform a promise from arising, or as discharging such a duty after it has arisen, because 
the promise either is impossible of performance when made or subsequently becomes so." Id. at 
§ 454, Comment a. Section 455 explains that the substantive defense applies only to objective 
impossibility. Id. at § 455, Comment a ("It is the difference between 'the thing cannot be done' 
and 'I cannot do it.' The first is objective; the second subjective."). The Restatement then goes 
on to compare the substantive defense set forth in Sections 454-455, which requires objective 
impossibility, with the equitable rule against specific performance, which applies where 
"performance by the defendant is impossible, either subjectively or objectively, and yet in which 
he is not discharged from duty." Id. at § 368, Comment a (emphasis added). 
-4-
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In arguing that the District Court applied the correct legal standard, Respondents point to 
the following statement in the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order: 
The Court cannot find that the present case presents a situation where 
performance is so unlikely and impossible that it would render the order 
futile. 
See R., p. 00083. That statement, however, came immediately after the citations to the 
substantive "impossibility of performance" cases and the District Court's explanation that 
"subjective impossibility" does not satisfy the test. Thus, it is clear that the District Court 
applied the wrong legal theory in granting summary judgment. Having failed to apply "the 
applicable legal standards," the District Court abused its discretion in ordering specific 
performance. 
3. Respondents Do Not Have A Contractual Right To Specific Performance 
Respondents next argue that they have a contractual right to specific performance. 
Notably, the District Court did not adopt this argument, which has been squarely rejected by 
many other courts. For example, in Black v. American Vending Co., Inc., 239 Ga. 632, 633, 238 
S .E.2d 420, 421 (Ga. 1977), the plaintiff argued that it was contractually entitled to specific 
performance because "a provision in the contract itself authorized injunction and specific 
performance to either party 'in the event of a breach or a threatened breach of any of the 
covenants, or provisions of the Lease ... "'. The Court rejected the argument and held that, 
regardless of the contract provision for specific performance, the question of whether an order of 
specific performance is appropriate must be determined by applying the rules of equity: 
The trial court correctly decided that the contract provision in question 
was void and unenforceable. Parties cannot by contract compel a court of 
equity to exercise its powers in what is really an ordinary case at law. 
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Id. (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in DiGiuseppe v. Lawler, 269 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. 2008), a contract provided that 
specific performance would be available in the event of a breach. Nevertheless, the court 
rejected the plaintiff's argument that "the parties' contract alters the manner in which the law 
applies to this case." Id. at 596. The Court further held that a specific performance provision 
"does not entitle DiGiuseppe to obtain specific performance merely upon a showing of a breach 
or default." Id. at 597. Instead, specific performance would only be ordered ifthe requirements 
for specific performance were met. !d. (rejecting the plaintiff's contention that a contractual 
specific performance provision would "negate or waive the requirement under Texas law that he 
prove his readiness, willingness, and ability to perform as a condition to obtaining specific 
performance."); see also Zannis v. Lake Shore Radiologists, Ltd. 392 N.E.2d 126, 129 (Ill. App. 
1979) ("[T]he mere fact that the parties to a personal services contract may have agreed therein 
to specific performance as a remedy cannot alter the necessity for imposing the general rule 
against compelling an employer to retain an employee."). 
Even where a contract contemplates specific performance, specific performance remains 
an equitable remedy subject to the general rules of equity. See generally, u.s. v. Stein, 452 F. 
Supp.2d 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Actions for specific performance and for injunctions always 
have been equitable in nature."); Houghton v. Mammoth Ariz. G.M Co., 68 P.2d 957,50 Ariz. 44 
(1937) ("The intervener is asking for specific performance, which is always regarded as an 
equitable action."); Brooks v. Commissioner o/Correction, 105 Conn. App. 149 (Conn. App. 
2007) ("[T]he primary purpose of a decree of specific performance, which is always an equitable 
remedy, is to place an injured [party] in a position that replicates, as nearly as possible, that 
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which [he or she] would have enjoyed but for the [other party's] unexcused breach.") (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
Moreover, even the contract as issue here recognizes that an order of specific 
performance would not be automatic. Instead, the contract provides that "the non-offending 
party shall have a remedy of specific performance and may apply to the district court of the 
county of Ada, state of Idaho to have this Settlement Agreement enforced by a judgment for 
specific performance." R., p. 91 (emphasis added). Thus, the parties recognized that a party 
would have to "apply to the district court" for an order of specific performance, leaving the 
actual entry of an award up to the court's discretion consistent with the rules of equity. 
4. The Appropriate Remedy Is An Award Of Damages 
The well-settled rule in Idaho is that the "usual measure of actual damages for a 
purchaser's breach of contract for sale of realty is the difference between the contract price and 
the market value ofthe property at time of breach, plus rental value for any period of possession 
by the purchaser." Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 261,846 P.2d 904,912 
(1993); see also Lawrence v. Franklin, 113 Idaho 895, 749 P.2d 1020 (et. App. 1988); Smith v. 
King, 100 Idaho 331, 597 P.2d 217 (1979). The measure of damages is the "difference between 
the market value and the contract price on the date of breach or on the date at which he regains 
possession of the land." Id. Moreover, the Plaintiff can obtain a damages award for "any 
appropriate consequential damages." Id. Specific performance "is an extraordinary remedy that 
can provide reliefwhen legal remedies are inadequate." Kessler v. Tortoise Development, Inc., 
134 Idaho 264, 270, 1 P.3d 292,298 (2000). 
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Here, there is no reason Respondents cannot be fully compensated by an award of 
damages. Damages can be easily calculated by ascertaining the value of the Subject Properties 
as of the date of breach (December 21,2007), and awarding Respondents the difference between 
that value and the contract price. 
Plaintiff contends that he cannot be made whole because Mr. Mason caused the Subject 
Properties to be joined into the Kuna sewer LID. Damages arising out ofthis fact, however, are 
easily quantifiable, and Respondents can be made whole by a money judgment. In fact, 
Respondents have informed this Court of the exact dollar amount of his alleged damages. See 
Respondent's Brief, p. vi ("On February 18, 2010, the City of Kuna issued a final assessment in 
the amount of$339,954.75"). 
Respondents similarly assert that they cannot be made whole because the Subject 
Properties have been annexed into the City of Kuna. As an initial matter, Respondents have not 
explained how the annexation has resulted in any harm to Respondents. If anything, it likely 
increases the value of the Subject Properties. More importantly, the order of specific 
performance does not remedy any harm to the respondents arising out of the annexation. 
Pursuant to the order of specific performance, Respondents have a valid, subsisting vendor's lien 
against the Subject Properties, which may be enforced through sale of the Subject Properties in 
the same manner and subject to the same restrictions as the execution sale of property subject to 
a decree of foreclosure as set forth in Chapter 1 of Title 6, Idaho Code. As they have already 
indicated, Respondents will satisfy the Judgment by foreclosing on their vendor's lien and 
having the properties sold at a foreclosure sale. When the Subject Properties are sold, 
Respondents may be entitled to a deficiency judgment. See Idaho Code § 6-108. Respondents 
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will almost certainly credit bid a portion of the Judgment and walk away with the Subject 
Property and a very large deficiency judgment. That deficiency judgment will result in a 
windfall to the Respondents in that it will be measured by the difference between the total 
judgment and the "reasonable value" of the Subject Property on the date of foreclosure (as 
opposed to the standard measure of damages of the difference between the contract price and the 
value of the property at the time of the breach.). Either way, Respondents will retain the Subject 
Property. The only practical difference is the amount of the final money judgment. 
The standard measure of damages - the difference between the contract price and the 
value of the Subject Properties as of December 21, 2007 - is the appropriate measure of 
damages. Given the availability of an adequate remedy at law, it was an abuse of discretion for 
the District Court to order specific performance. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court abused its discretion in entering an order of specific performance, 
requiring Mr. Mason to close on the Subject Properties. First, the District Court abused its 
discretion by applying the wrong legal theory to the facts of this case. Second, the District 
Court's order violates the equitable rule against specific performance where the Plaintiff has an 
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